unlock it. Signifi cant and persistent barriers will need to be addressed at multiple levels to stimulate demand for energy effi ciency and manage its delivery . . . If executed at scale, a holistic approach would yield gross energy savings worth more than $1.2 trillion, well above the $520 billion needed through 2020 for upfront investment in effi ciency measures (not including program costs). Such a program is estimated to reduce end-use energy consumption in 2020 by 9.1 quadrillion BTUs, roughly 23 percent of projected demand, potentially abating up to 1.1 gigatons of greenhouse gases annually.
In economic language, the "win-win" argument is that government intervenIn economic language, the "win-win" argument is that government intervention to encourage energy effi ciency can improve welfare for two reasons. First, the tion to encourage energy effi ciency can improve welfare for two reasons. First, the consumption of fossil fuels, which comprise the bulk of our current energy sources, consumption of fossil fuels, which comprise the bulk of our current energy sources, causes externalities such as harm to human health, climate change, and constraints causes externalities such as harm to human health, climate change, and constraints on the foreign policy objectives of energy-importing countries. Second, other forces on the foreign policy objectives of energy-importing countries. Second, other forces such as imperfect information may cause consumers and fi rms not to undertake such as imperfect information may cause consumers and fi rms not to undertake privately profi table investments in energy effi ciency. These forces, which we refer privately profi table investments in energy effi ciency. These forces, which we refer to as "investment ineffi ciencies," would create what is popularly called an Energy to as "investment ineffi ciencies," would create what is popularly called an Energy Effi ciency Gap: a wedge between the cost-minimizing level of energy effi ciency and Effi ciency Gap: a wedge between the cost-minimizing level of energy effi ciency and the level actually realized. Yergin, McKinsey & Co., and other analysts have argued the level actually realized. Yergin, McKinsey & Co., and other analysts have argued that this gap represents a signifi cant share of total energy use: in their view, the that this gap represents a signifi cant share of total energy use: in their view, the ground is littered with $20 bills that energy consumers have failed to pick up. ground is littered with $20 bills that energy consumers have failed to pick up.
The energy effi ciency policy debate often comingles these two types of market The energy effi ciency policy debate often comingles these two types of market failures-energy use externalities and investment ineffi ciencies-causing imprecifailures-energy use externalities and investment ineffi ciencies-causing imprecision in research questions and policy goals. In this paper, we distinguish between sion in research questions and policy goals. In this paper, we distinguish between the two market failures and clarify their separate policy implications. If energy use the two market failures and clarify their separate policy implications. If energy use externalities are the only market failure, it is well known that the social optimum externalities are the only market failure, it is well known that the social optimum is obtained with Pigouvian taxes or equivalent cap-and-trade programs that interis obtained with Pigouvian taxes or equivalent cap-and-trade programs that internalize these externalities into energy prices, and that substitute policies are often nalize these externalities into energy prices, and that substitute policies are often much less economically effi cient. If investment ineffi ciencies also exist, the fi rst-best much less economically effi cient. If investment ineffi ciencies also exist, the fi rst-best policy is to address the ineffi ciency directly: for example, by providing informapolicy is to address the ineffi ciency directly: for example, by providing information to imperfectly informed consumers. However, when these interventions are tion to imperfectly informed consumers. However, when these interventions are not fully effective and investment ineffi ciencies remain, policies that subsidize or not fully effective and investment ineffi ciencies remain, policies that subsidize or mandate energy effi ciency might increase welfare. The central economic question mandate energy effi ciency might increase welfare. The central economic question around energy effi ciency is thus whether there are investment ineffi ciencies that a around energy effi ciency is thus whether there are investment ineffi ciencies that a policy could correct-in other words, "Is there an Energy Effi ciency Gap?" policy could correct-in other words, "Is there an Energy Effi ciency Gap?"
We examine two classes of evidence on the existence and magnitude of investWe examine two classes of evidence on the existence and magnitude of investment ineffi ciencies that could cause the Energy Effi ciency Gap. First, we examine ment ineffi ciencies that could cause the Energy Effi ciency Gap. First, we examine choices made by consumers and fi rms, testing whether they fail to make investments choices made by consumers and fi rms, testing whether they fail to make investments that would increase utility or profi ts. Second, we focus on specifi c investment inefthat would increase utility or profi ts. Second, we focus on specifi c investment ineffi ciencies, testing for evidence consistent with each. After presenting the evidence, fi ciencies, testing for evidence consistent with each. After presenting the evidence, we discuss policy implications. Throughout the paper, we highlight how the we discuss policy implications. Throughout the paper, we highlight how the economics of energy effi ciency connects to important questions in other applied economics of energy effi ciency connects to important questions in other applied micro fi elds, including behavioral economics, industrial organization, and developmicro fi elds, including behavioral economics, industrial organization, and development microeconomics. ment microeconomics.
Hunt Allcott and Michael Greenstone 5
Three key conclusions arise. First, although there is a long literature assessing Three key conclusions arise. First, although there is a long literature assessing investment ineffi ciencies related to energy effi ciency, this body of evidence frequently investment ineffi ciencies related to energy effi ciency, this body of evidence frequently does not meet modern standards for credibility. A basic problem is that much of the does not meet modern standards for credibility. A basic problem is that much of the evidence on the energy cost savings from energy effi ciency comes from engineering evidence on the energy cost savings from energy effi ciency comes from engineering analyses or observational studies that can suffer from a set of well-known biases. analyses or observational studies that can suffer from a set of well-known biases. Furthermore, even if the energy cost savings were known, energy effi ciency investFurthermore, even if the energy cost savings were known, energy effi ciency investments often have other unobserved costs and benefi ts, making it diffi cult to assess ments often have other unobserved costs and benefi ts, making it diffi cult to assess welfare effects. This problem is general to other economic applications: in order to welfare effects. This problem is general to other economic applications: in order to argue that an agent is not maximizing an objective function, the analyst must credargue that an agent is not maximizing an objective function, the analyst must credibly observe that objective function in full. We believe that there is great potential ibly observe that objective function in full. We believe that there is great potential for a new body of credible empirical work in this area, both because the questions for a new body of credible empirical work in this area, both because the questions are so important and because there are signifi cant unexploited opportunities for are so important and because there are signifi cant unexploited opportunities for randomized controlled trials and quasi-experimental designs that have advanced randomized controlled trials and quasi-experimental designs that have advanced knowledge in other domains. knowledge in other domains.
Second, when one tallies up the available empirical evidence from different Second, when one tallies up the available empirical evidence from different contexts, it is diffi cult to substantiate claims of a pervasive Energy Effi ciency Gap. contexts, it is diffi cult to substantiate claims of a pervasive Energy Effi ciency Gap. Some consumers appear to be imperfectly informed, and the evidence suggests Some consumers appear to be imperfectly informed, and the evidence suggests that investment ineffi ciencies do cause an increase in energy use in various settings. that investment ineffi ciencies do cause an increase in energy use in various settings. However, the empirical magnitudes of the investment ineffi ciencies appear to be However, the empirical magnitudes of the investment ineffi ciencies appear to be smaller, indeed substantially smaller, than the massive potential savings calculated smaller, indeed substantially smaller, than the massive potential savings calculated in engineering analyses such as McKinsey & Co. (2009) . in engineering analyses such as McKinsey & Co. (2009) .
Third, because consumers are quite heterogeneous in the degree of their Third, because consumers are quite heterogeneous in the degree of their investment ineffi ciencies, it is crucial to design targeted policies. Subsidizing energy investment ineffi ciencies, it is crucial to design targeted policies. Subsidizing energy effi cient durables, for example, changes relative prices for all consumers. While this effi cient durables, for example, changes relative prices for all consumers. While this policy will increase welfare for some consumers, such benefi ts must be traded off policy will increase welfare for some consumers, such benefi ts must be traded off against distortions to consumers not subject to ineffi ciencies. Policy evaluations must against distortions to consumers not subject to ineffi ciencies. Policy evaluations must therefore consider not just how much a policy increases energy effi ciency, but what therefore consider not just how much a policy increases energy effi ciency, but what types of consumers are induced to become more energy effi cient. Welfare gains will types of consumers are induced to become more energy effi cient. Welfare gains will be larger from a policy that preferentially affects the decisions of consumers subject be larger from a policy that preferentially affects the decisions of consumers subject to investment ineffi ciencies. to investment ineffi ciencies. Table 1 presents the breakdown of total energy demand across the sectors of Table 1 presents the breakdown of total energy demand across the sectors of the U.S. economy. Much of our discussion focuses on household energy use and the U.S. economy. Much of our discussion focuses on household energy use and personal transportation instead of commercial and industrial energy use, because personal transportation instead of commercial and industrial energy use, because these are areas where ineffi ciencies of imperfect information might be more severe. these are areas where ineffi ciencies of imperfect information might be more severe. In 2007, the average U.S. household spent $2,400 on gasoline for their autos and In 2007, the average U.S. household spent $2,400 on gasoline for their autos and another $1,900 on natural gas, electricity, and heating oil (U.S. Bureau of Labor another $1,900 on natural gas, electricity, and heating oil (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2007). Of this latter fi gure, heating and cooling are the most signifi cant Statistics 2007). Of this latter fi gure, heating and cooling are the most signifi cant end uses, which suggests that they may also be the areas where energy conservation end uses, which suggests that they may also be the areas where energy conservation could have the largest effect. could have the largest effect.
Background Facts on Energy Demand

Overview of Energy Demand and Energy Effi ciency
Journal of Economic Perspectives
The smaller the variance in energy costs across products relative to the total The smaller the variance in energy costs across products relative to the total purchase price, the more likely it is that consumers will choose to remain imperpurchase price, the more likely it is that consumers will choose to remain imperfectly informed about, or inattentive to, these costs (Sallee 2011) . Figure 1 shows fectly informed about, or inattentive to, these costs (Sallee 2011) . Figure 1 shows the lifetime energy cost of a selection of energy-using durables, discounted at the lifetime energy cost of a selection of energy-using durables, discounted at 6 percent over each good's typical lifetime, as well as the ratio of energy cost to 6 percent over each good's typical lifetime, as well as the ratio of energy cost to the purchase price. For example, if gasoline costs $3 per gallon, lifetime gasoline the purchase price. For example, if gasoline costs $3 per gallon, lifetime gasoline costs are $19,000 for a typical pickup truck, or 83 percent of the purchase price, costs are $19,000 for a typical pickup truck, or 83 percent of the purchase price, and $10,000 for a relatively energy effi cient sedan, or about 66 percent of purchase and $10,000 for a relatively energy effi cient sedan, or about 66 percent of purchase price. Typical lifetime energy costs are fi ve times greater than purchase prices for price. Typical lifetime energy costs are fi ve times greater than purchase prices for air conditioners and 12 times greater for incandescent light bulbs, but only about air conditioners and 12 times greater for incandescent light bulbs, but only about one-third of purchase price for a typical refrigerator. one-third of purchase price for a typical refrigerator.
The most aggregate measure of energy effi ciency is the ratio of GDP to total The most aggregate measure of energy effi ciency is the ratio of GDP to total energy use, with different energy sources combined using common physical units. As energy use, with different energy sources combined using common physical units. As shown in Figure 2 , U.S. "energy productivity" per unit of GDP is 2.4 times higher than shown in Figure 2 , U.S. "energy productivity" per unit of GDP is 2.4 times higher than in 1949. Various factors drive this continual improvement, including compositional in 1949. Various factors drive this continual improvement, including compositional changes in the economy toward less-energy-intensive industries, energy effi ciency changes in the economy toward less-energy-intensive industries, energy effi ciency policies, and other forces that drive total factor productivity growth. Energy prices policies, and other forces that drive total factor productivity growth. Energy prices also induce factor substitution and technical change: the fi gure suggests this effect, also induce factor substitution and technical change: the fi gure suggests this effect, showing that the fastest improvements in energy productivity were in the 1970s showing that the fastest improvements in energy productivity were in the 1970s and the most recent 15 years, both periods of relatively high energy prices. The and the most recent 15 years, both periods of relatively high energy prices. The fi gure also shows that U.S. energy productivity has grown faster than total factor fi gure also shows that U.S. energy productivity has grown faster than total factor productivity since the beginning of that data series in 1987, meaning that through productivity since the beginning of that data series in 1987, meaning that through some combination of directed technical change and factor substitution, the United some combination of directed technical change and factor substitution, the United States is economizing on energy faster than it is economizing on other factors. The States is economizing on energy faster than it is economizing on other factors. The U.S. economy is more energy intensive than other OECD countries, although it has U.S. economy is more energy intensive than other OECD countries, although it has improved more quickly since 1980, and less energy intensive than the set of low-and improved more quickly since 1980, and less energy intensive than the set of low-and middle-income countries. In sum, the U.S. economy is progressively becoming less middle-income countries. In sum, the U.S. economy is progressively becoming less energy intensive, although this is uninformative about whether the United States is energy intensive, although this is uninformative about whether the United States is at or near the economically effi cient level of energy effi ciency. at or near the economically effi cient level of energy effi ciency. Source: Data are from U.S. Energy Information Administration (2005, 2011a) .
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Figure 1 Energy Costs for Durable Goods
Lifetime energy costs ($)
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Figure 2 Energy Productivity Trends
Sources: For U.S. energy input productivity 1949-1980, U.S. EIA Annual Energy Review (2011a), table 1.5 〈http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/showtext.cfm?t=ptb0105⟩; for U.S. multifactor productivity, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 〈http://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet⟩; for other energy productivity, World Bank World Development Indicators, 〈http://data.worldbank.org/indicator⟩. Notes: PPP is "purchasing power parity." Multifactor productivity index equals 100 in 1990. 1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 U.S. energy productivity Low/middle income country energy productivity OECD energy productivity U.S. multifactor productivity
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Energy Effi ciency Policy in the United States
The United States has enacted a wide array of policies to encourage energy The United States has enacted a wide array of policies to encourage energy effi ciency, many of which were originally promulgated during the energy crises of effi ciency, many of which were originally promulgated during the energy crises of the 1970s. Table 2 presents the most signifi cant of these policies, along with some the 1970s. Table 2 presents the most signifi cant of these policies, along with some measure of their annual costs. Auto industry policies include: Corporate Average measure of their annual costs. Auto industry policies include: Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, which require that the new cars and trucks sold by Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, which require that the new cars and trucks sold by each auto manufacturer meet a minimum average rating based on miles-per-gallon; each auto manufacturer meet a minimum average rating based on miles-per-gallon; tax credits of up to $3,400 for hybrid vehicle buyers; and "gas guzzler taxes" ranging tax credits of up to $3,400 for hybrid vehicle buyers; and "gas guzzler taxes" ranging from $1,000 to $7,700 on the sale of passenger cars with low fuel economy. There are from $1,000 to $7,700 on the sale of passenger cars with low fuel economy. There are a series of national-level minimum energy effi ciency standards for household applia series of national-level minimum energy effi ciency standards for household appliances, such as refrigerators, air conditioners, and washing machines. Additionally, ances, such as refrigerators, air conditioners, and washing machines. Additionally, many states have building codes that encourage energy effi ciency by, for example, many states have building codes that encourage energy effi ciency by, for example, stipulating minimum amounts of required insulation. Furthermore, electricity bill stipulating minimum amounts of required insulation. Furthermore, electricity bill surcharges fund billions of dollars of utility-managed "demand-side management" surcharges fund billions of dollars of utility-managed "demand-side management" programs, which include subsidized residential and commercial energy audits, programs, which include subsidized residential and commercial energy audits, energy effi ciency information provision, and subsidies for energy effi cient applienergy effi ciency information provision, and subsidies for energy effi cient appliances and other capital investments. ances and other capital investments. "Weatherization" is frequently used as a general term for a set of residential "Weatherization" is frequently used as a general term for a set of residential energy effi ciency investments primarily including wall and attic insulation, improved energy effi ciency investments primarily including wall and attic insulation, improved heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems, and "air-sealing," which reduces heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems, and "air-sealing," which reduces the leakage of hot or cold outside air. Through the Weatherization Assistance the leakage of hot or cold outside air. Through the Weatherization Assistance Program, the federal government transfers $250 million annually to state agencies to Program, the federal government transfers $250 million annually to state agencies to weatherize approximately 100,000 low-income homes. Weatherization funding grew weatherize approximately 100,000 low-income homes. Weatherization funding grew signifi cantly due to the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. In total, signifi cantly due to the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. In total, that legislation and related economic stimulus bills included $17 billion in energy that legislation and related economic stimulus bills included $17 billion in energy effi ciency spending, including non-low-income weatherization programs, automoeffi ciency spending, including non-low-income weatherization programs, automobile and appliance cash-for-clunkers programs with energy effi ciency requirements bile and appliance cash-for-clunkers programs with energy effi ciency requirements on new models, and other grants to state programs. on new models, and other grants to state programs.
In this paper, the phrase "energy effi ciency policies" refers to this set of subsiIn this paper, the phrase "energy effi ciency policies" refers to this set of subsidies and standards that directly encourage investment in energy effi cient capital dies and standards that directly encourage investment in energy effi cient capital stock but do not directly affect energy prices. Although gasoline taxes, cap-and-trade stock but do not directly affect energy prices. Although gasoline taxes, cap-and-trade programs, or other policies that affect energy prices will of course also increase programs, or other policies that affect energy prices will of course also increase investment in energy effi cient capital stock, these policies that act through energy investment in energy effi cient capital stock, these policies that act through energy prices are conceptually distinct in our policy analysis. prices are conceptually distinct in our policy analysis.
A Model of Investment in Energy Effi ciency
The basic economics of energy effi ciency are captured by a model in which The basic economics of energy effi ciency are captured by a model in which an agent, either a profi t-maximizing fi rm or utility-maximizing consumer, chooses an agent, either a profi t-maximizing fi rm or utility-maximizing consumer, chooses between two different versions of an energy-using durable good such as an autobetween two different versions of an energy-using durable good such as an automobile, air conditioner, or light bulb. mobile, air conditioner, or light bulb.
1 1 This setup can also represent a choice of This setup can also represent a choice of whether to improve the energy effi ciency of an existing building, for example whether to improve the energy effi ciency of an existing building, for example through weatherization. In the fi rst period, the agent chooses and pays for capital through weatherization. In the fi rst period, the agent chooses and pays for capital investments. In the second period, the consumer uses the good and incurs investments. In the second period, the consumer uses the good and incurs energy costs. energy costs.
The two different goods are denoted 0, for the energy ineffi cient baseline, and The two different goods are denoted 0, for the energy ineffi cient baseline, and 1, for the energy effi cient version. They have energy intensities 1, for the energy effi cient version. They have energy intensities e 0 0 and and e 1 1 , respectively, , respectively, with with e 0 0 > > e 1 1 . The energy effi cient good has incremental upfront capital cost . The energy effi cient good has incremental upfront capital cost c > > 0 and 0 and unobserved incremental opportunity cost or utility cost unobserved incremental opportunity cost or utility cost ξ ξ. The variable . The variable ξ ξ could either could either be positive (an unobserved cost) or negative (an unobserved benefi t). The private be positive (an unobserved cost) or negative (an unobserved benefi t). The private cost of energy is cost of energy is p, and the risk-adjusted discount rate between the two periods is , and the risk-adjusted discount rate between the two periods is r > > 0. The variable 0. The variable m represents an agent's taste for usage of the durable good; a high represents an agent's taste for usage of the durable good; a high m refl ects an air conditioner user in a hot climate or a car owner who drives a long refl ects an air conditioner user in a hot climate or a car owner who drives a long way to work. The variable way to work. The variable m is implicitly a function of energy prices: as energy prices is implicitly a function of energy prices: as energy prices rise, the cost of utilization increases, so utilization decreases. We index rise, the cost of utilization increases, so utilization decreases. We index m i i to explicitly to explicitly recognize that it varies across agents, although in practice recognize that it varies across agents, although in practice ξ ξ and and p will also vary.
will also vary. In the basic case, an agent's willingness-to-pay for the energy effi cient good is In the basic case, an agent's willingness-to-pay for the energy effi cient good is the discounted energy cost savings net of unobserved costs. Agent the discounted energy cost savings net of unobserved costs. Agent i will choose the will choose the energy effi cient good if and only if willingness to pay outweighs the incremental energy effi cient good if and only if willingness to pay outweighs the incremental capital costs: capital costs:
To capture the essence of the Energy Effi ciency Gap, we introduce the parameter γ, which is an implicit weight on the energy cost savings in the agent's decision. Now, the agent chooses the energy effi cient good if and only if:
For the purpose of determining the effects of subsidizing the energy effi cient good, the γ parameter is a suffi cient statistic for all investment ineffi ciencies. As we will discuss later in more detail, there are several distinct types of investment inefficiencies. First, agents may be unaware of, imperfectly informed about, or inattentive to energy cost savings. Second, agents may be themselves perfectly informed but unable to convey costlessly the energy intensity e 1 of an improved house or apartment they are selling or renting to others. Third, credit markets may be imperfect, meaning that agents may not have access to credit at the risk-adjusted discount rate r.
2 The γ parameter is conceptually related to what others have called an "implied discount rate," which is the discount rate that rationalizes the tradeoffs that agents make between upfront investment costs and future energy savings.
It is often asserted that It is often asserted that γ γ < < 1, meaning that investment ineffi ciencies cause agents 1, meaning that investment ineffi ciencies cause agents to value discounted energy cost savings less than upfront costs. Notice that when this to value discounted energy cost savings less than upfront costs. Notice that when this is the case, some agents do not choose the energy effi cient good despite the fact that is the case, some agents do not choose the energy effi cient good despite the fact that this would be profi table at current energy prices. Formally, asserting that there is an this would be profi table at current energy prices. Formally, asserting that there is an "Energy Effi ciency Gap" is exactly equivalent to asserting that there are investment "Energy Effi ciency Gap" is exactly equivalent to asserting that there are investment ineffi ciencies and ineffi ciencies and γ γ < < 1. Of course, in some settings it might be that 1. Of course, in some settings it might be that γ γ > > 1. 1. Other than the investment ineffi ciencies captured by Other than the investment ineffi ciencies captured by γ γ, the additional element , the additional element of the "win-win argument" is that there are additional social costs from energy use of the "win-win argument" is that there are additional social costs from energy use that are not internalized into energy prices. We denote this uninternalized exterthat are not internalized into energy prices. We denote this uninternalized externality by nality by φ φ. In the social optimum, the agent adopts the energy effi cient good if:
. In the social optimum, the agent adopts the energy effi cient good if:
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The social optimum differs from the agent's choice in the previous equation for two reasons. First, the allocation accounts for the externality φ. Second, the allocation is not affected by investment ineffi ciencies, so γ = 1. Figure 3 illustrates the three cases. The fi gure's horizontal axis represents the Figure 3 illustrates the three cases. The fi gure's horizontal axis represents the quantity of the energy effi cient good that is purchased, while the vertical axis shows quantity of the energy effi cient good that is purchased, while the vertical axis shows the incremental costs and benefi ts of purchasing that good. The height of a demand the incremental costs and benefi ts of purchasing that good. The height of a demand curve at each point refl ects some individual agent's willingness-to-pay from the leftcurve at each point refl ects some individual agent's willingness-to-pay from the lefthand side of a corresponding equation above. The agents on the left side of the hand side of a corresponding equation above. The agents on the left side of the fi gure, with higher willingness-to-pay, tend to have high usage fi gure, with higher willingness-to-pay, tend to have high usage m, low unobserved , low unobserved cost cost ξ ξ, and high energy price , and high energy price p. . The lowest demand curve, denoted The lowest demand curve, denoted D, refl ects the case in the second equa-, refl ects the case in the second equation with both investment ineffi ciencies ( tion with both investment ineffi ciencies (γ γ < < 1) and uninternalized energy use 1) and uninternalized energy use externalities. In this case, the market equilibrium is at point externalities. In this case, the market equilibrium is at point a, the intersection , the intersection of demand curve of demand curve D with incremental cost with incremental cost c. Demand curve . Demand curve D′ ′ refl ects the case in refl ects the case in . Adding a Pigouvian tax on energy consumption (based on the energy source's pollution content) increases willingness-to-pay more for the consumers on the left pollution content) increases willingness-to-pay more for the consumers on the left of the fi gure with higher utilization, so demand curve of the fi gure with higher utilization, so demand curve D ″ ″ rotates clockwise relarotates clockwise relative to demand curve tive to demand curve D ′ ′. The fi rst-best equilibrium is point . The fi rst-best equilibrium is point d, where , where D ″ ″ intersects intersects incremental cost incremental cost c. .
From a policy perspective, it is crucial to distinguish the two types of market From a policy perspective, it is crucial to distinguish the two types of market failures, energy use externalities and investment ineffi ciencies. The reason derives failures, energy use externalities and investment ineffi ciencies. The reason derives from the general principle that policies should address market failures as directly as from the general principle that policies should address market failures as directly as possible. If there are no investment ineffi ciencies but energy prices are below social possible. If there are no investment ineffi ciencies but energy prices are below social cost due to uninternalized energy use externalities, demand is represented by cost due to uninternalized energy use externalities, demand is represented by D ′ ′. . This causes a distortion both in the purchase and in the utilization of energy-using This causes a distortion both in the purchase and in the utilization of energy-using durables: for example, consumers buy too many gas guzzlers and drive them too durables: for example, consumers buy too many gas guzzlers and drive them too much. A Pigouvian tax of amount much. A Pigouvian tax of amount φ φ on energy (on gas, in the example) would on energy (on gas, in the example) would give both the socially optimal quantity demanded ( give both the socially optimal quantity demanded (q ″ ″ ) of the energy effi cient good ) of the energy effi cient good and the socially optimal utilization. By contrast, as long as utilization is not fully and the socially optimal utilization. By contrast, as long as utilization is not fully price-inelastic, a subsidy for the energy effi cient good does not achieve the fi rst best. price-inelastic, a subsidy for the energy effi cient good does not achieve the fi rst best. While this could move quantity demanded to While this could move quantity demanded to q ″ ″, consumers would not face the true , consumers would not face the true social cost of energy when deciding how much to use the good: consumers would social cost of energy when deciding how much to use the good: consumers would buy the right number of gas guzzlers but still drive them too much. buy the right number of gas guzzlers but still drive them too much.
Many investment ineffi ciencies, on the other hand, distort purchases but not Many investment ineffi ciencies, on the other hand, distort purchases but not utilization. If there are investment ineffi ciencies but no uninternalized energy use utilization. If there are investment ineffi ciencies but no uninternalized energy use externalities, the optimal corrective policy affects purchases, but not utilization. For externalities, the optimal corrective policy affects purchases, but not utilization. For example, Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky (2011) show that when consumers example, Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky (2011) show that when consumers have homogeneous have homogeneous γ γ < < 1 and vary only in utilization 1 and vary only in utilization m i i , the fi rst-best policy involves , the fi rst-best policy involves a subsidy for the energy effi cient good. a subsidy for the energy effi cient good.
3 3 In Figure 3 , that optimal subsidy would In Figure 3 , that optimal subsidy would move quantity demanded from move quantity demanded from q to to q ′ ′. Notice that an energy tax could potentially . Notice that an energy tax could potentially also correct the investment ineffi ciency, giving the same marginal consumer at also correct the investment ineffi ciency, giving the same marginal consumer at q ′ ′. . However, as long as utilization is not fully inelastic, an energy tax that gives price However, as long as utilization is not fully inelastic, an energy tax that gives price above social cost (to correct the investment ineffi ciency) would cause consumers to above social cost (to correct the investment ineffi ciency) would cause consumers to reduce utilization below the fi rst-best level: consumers would buy the right number reduce utilization below the fi rst-best level: consumers would buy the right number of gas guzzlers and then drive them too little. of gas guzzlers and then drive them too little.
Putting these arguments together, when there are distortions from both Putting these arguments together, when there are distortions from both uninternalized energy use externalities and investment ineffi ciencies, the fi rst-best uninternalized energy use externalities and investment ineffi ciencies, the fi rst-best policy involves both Pigouvian taxes on energy and a second mechanism to increase policy involves both Pigouvian taxes on energy and a second mechanism to increase quantity demanded of the energy effi cient good. This second mechanism may quantity demanded of the energy effi cient good. This second mechanism may be a subsidy for the energy effi cient good, although as we will discuss later in the be a subsidy for the energy effi cient good, although as we will discuss later in the paper, heterogeneity in the investment ineffi ciency paper, heterogeneity in the investment ineffi ciency γ γ makes subsidies potentially makes subsidies potentially less desirable. less desirable.
3 Heutel (2011) obtains a comparable result using a different model of investment ineffi ciencies.
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How can this framework be used for cost-benefi t analysis? Consider fi rst How can this framework be used for cost-benefi t analysis? Consider fi rst adding the subsidy in isolation, without any Pigouvian tax on energy. When there adding the subsidy in isolation, without any Pigouvian tax on energy. When there are investment ineffi ciencies, the original marginal consumer at quantity are investment ineffi ciencies, the original marginal consumer at quantity q gains gains amount amount af from being induced to buy the energy effi cient good. In fact, there are from being induced to buy the energy effi cient good. In fact, there are allocative gains from inducing each of the consumers between allocative gains from inducing each of the consumers between q and and q ′ ′ to purchase to purchase the energy effi cient good, as each of these consumers has benefi ts that are larger the energy effi cient good, as each of these consumers has benefi ts that are larger than incremental cost than incremental cost c. The total private welfare gains are illustrated by the triangle . The total private welfare gains are illustrated by the triangle abf. If a Pigouvian tax on energy is added to this subsidy, then the total social welfare . If a Pigouvian tax on energy is added to this subsidy, then the total social welfare gain is illustrated by the triangle gain is illustrated by the triangle adg. . These benefi ts are then compared against the costs of the policy. A subsidy These benefi ts are then compared against the costs of the policy. A subsidy involves a transfer of public funds to consumers of amount involves a transfer of public funds to consumers of amount hbjk, as illustrated by , as illustrated by the shaded rectangle. If those funds could otherwise be used to lower labor taxes, the shaded rectangle. If those funds could otherwise be used to lower labor taxes, the deadweight loss of these taxes would be included as a social cost, along with any the deadweight loss of these taxes would be included as a social cost, along with any other costs of administering the subsidy. other costs of administering the subsidy.
4 4 Similarly, an information program that Similarly, an information program that moved demand from moved demand from D to to D ′ ′ would also increase private welfare by would also increase private welfare by abf, and this , and this welfare gain would be traded off with the costs of implementation. For any policy, it welfare gain would be traded off with the costs of implementation. For any policy, it will be an empirical question whether the costs exceed the benefi ts, and whether the will be an empirical question whether the costs exceed the benefi ts, and whether the net benefi ts are larger than alternative policies. This approach to assessing net welfare net benefi ts are larger than alternative policies. This approach to assessing net welfare benefi ts is the appropriate test of whether energy effi ciency policies are socially benefi ts is the appropriate test of whether energy effi ciency policies are socially benefi cial when Pigouvian taxes are also available to correct energy use externalities. benefi cial when Pigouvian taxes are also available to correct energy use externalities.
To summarize, this section has analyzed two forces that can cause behavior to To summarize, this section has analyzed two forces that can cause behavior to differ from the social optimum: energy use externalities and investment ineffi ciendiffer from the social optimum: energy use externalities and investment ineffi ciencies. If there are energy use externalities but no investment ineffi ciencies, ideally cies. If there are energy use externalities but no investment ineffi ciencies, ideally only Pigouvian taxes would be used. If there are investment ineffi ciencies, energy only Pigouvian taxes would be used. If there are investment ineffi ciencies, energy effi ciency policies such as subsidies for energy effi cient capital stock might have effi ciency policies such as subsidies for energy effi cient capital stock might have benefi ts that outweigh their costs. If there are both investment ineffi ciencies and benefi ts that outweigh their costs. If there are both investment ineffi ciencies and energy use externalities, then Pigouvian taxes should be used in combination with energy use externalities, then Pigouvian taxes should be used in combination with some welfare-improving energy effi ciency policy. The central economic questions some welfare-improving energy effi ciency policy. The central economic questions are thus whether there are investment ineffi ciencies, and if so, whether the benefi ts are thus whether there are investment ineffi ciencies, and if so, whether the benefi ts of a corrective policy outweigh its costs. of a corrective policy outweigh its costs.
In the next section, we will examine choices by consumers and fi rms to adopt In the next section, we will examine choices by consumers and fi rms to adopt or not adopt energy effi cient technologies and attempt to infer whether there is an or not adopt energy effi cient technologies and attempt to infer whether there is an Energy Effi ciency Gap. When there are no investment ineffi ciencies, agents' choices Energy Effi ciency Gap. When there are no investment ineffi ciencies, agents' choices are governed by the fi rst equation above, and unobserved factors such as costs are governed by the fi rst equation above, and unobserved factors such as costs ξ ξ or or utilization utilization m can be inferred from their decisions. Some analysts have relied heavily can be inferred from their decisions. Some analysts have relied heavily on this framework in explaining away an apparent Energy Effi ciency Gap, with an on this framework in explaining away an apparent Energy Effi ciency Gap, with an argument along the lines that "agents are well-informed, so if they are not energy argument along the lines that "agents are well-informed, so if they are not energy effi cient, then it must be that the unobserved costs of energy effi ciency are large." effi cient, then it must be that the unobserved costs of energy effi ciency are large." The analysis is more diffi cult when there might be investment ineffi ciencies. In that The analysis is more diffi cult when there might be investment ineffi ciencies. In that case, we now must know everything about agents' objective functions to estimate case, we now must know everything about agents' objective functions to estimate the size of the size of γ γ. . Three types of problems will pervade the analyses we review in the next section. Three types of problems will pervade the analyses we review in the next section. First, factors that are diffi cult to observe or quantify, as denoted by First, factors that are diffi cult to observe or quantify, as denoted by ξ ξ in our model in our model above, will be potentially very relevant. Second, estimates of the net present value above, will be potentially very relevant. Second, estimates of the net present value of energy cost savings are often questionable. Depending on the setting, this could of energy cost savings are often questionable. Depending on the setting, this could be because the analyst does not know the change in energy intensity ( be because the analyst does not know the change in energy intensity (e 0 0 --e 1 1 ), the ), the utilization utilization m, or the appropriate discount rate , or the appropriate discount rate r. Third, there is often substantial . Third, there is often substantial heterogeneity across consumers in utilization and unobserved costs, meaning that heterogeneity across consumers in utilization and unobserved costs, meaning that average returns for adopters might be uninformative about average returns for nonaverage returns for adopters might be uninformative about average returns for nonadopters or returns for the marginal adopter. adopters or returns for the marginal adopter.
These empirical problems directly parallel other economic contexts. Consider, These empirical problems directly parallel other economic contexts. Consider, for example, the question of whether farmers in developing countries could proffor example, the question of whether farmers in developing countries could profitably adopt agricultural technologies such as fertilizer and high-yielding variety itably adopt agricultural technologies such as fertilizer and high-yielding variety seeds. These technologies have unobserved costs, such as increased labor inputs seeds. These technologies have unobserved costs, such as increased labor inputs (Foster and Rosenzweig 2010) . It is diffi cult to know the resulting increase in profi ts (Foster and Rosenzweig 2010) . It is diffi cult to know the resulting increase in profi ts without randomized controlled trials, as in Dufl o, Kremer, and Robinson (2011) . without randomized controlled trials, as in Dufl o, Kremer, and Robinson (2011) . Also, the substantial heterogeneity in costs and gross returns means that the fact Also, the substantial heterogeneity in costs and gross returns means that the fact that adopters have high returns does not imply that non-adopters are foregoing a that adopters have high returns does not imply that non-adopters are foregoing a profi table investment (Suri 2011). profi table investment (Suri 2011).
Evidence on Returns to Energy Effi ciency Investments
In this section, we analyze the evidence on whether consumers and fi rms leave In this section, we analyze the evidence on whether consumers and fi rms leave profi table energy effi ciency investments on the table. There are four categories profi table energy effi ciency investments on the table. There are four categories of evidence: engineering estimates of returns to potential investments, empirical of evidence: engineering estimates of returns to potential investments, empirical estimates of returns to observed investments, the cost effectiveness of energy estimates of returns to observed investments, the cost effectiveness of energy conservation programs run by electric utilities, and estimated demand patterns for conservation programs run by electric utilities, and estimated demand patterns for energy-using durables. energy-using durables.
Engineering Estimates of Energy Conservation Cost Curves
While (2009) study quoted in our introduction has garnered substantial attention, it is preceded by a long literature that uses engineering cost substantial attention, it is preceded by a long literature that uses engineering cost estimates to construct "supply curves" for energy effi ciency (for example, Meier, estimates to construct "supply curves" for energy effi ciency (for example, Meier, Wright, and Rosenfeld 1983; ACEEE 1989; Goldstein, Mowris, Davis, and Dolan Wright, and Rosenfeld 1983; ACEEE 1989; Goldstein, Mowris, Davis, and Dolan 1990; Koomey et al. 1991; Brown, Levine, Romm, Rosenfeld, and Koomey 1998; 1990; Koomey et al. 1991; Brown, Levine, Romm, Rosenfeld, and Koomey 1998 ; National Academy of Sciences 1992; Rosenfeld, Atkinson, Koomey, Meier, Mowris, National Academy of Sciences 1992; Rosenfeld, Atkinson, Koomey, Meier, Mowris, and Price 1993; Stoft 1995; Blumstein and Stoft 1995; Brown, Levine, Short, and and Price 1993; Stoft 1995; Blumstein and Stoft 1995; Brown, Levine, Short, and Koomey 2001) . The basic approach in such studies is to calculate the net present Koomey 2001) . The basic approach in such studies is to calculate the net present value of a set of possible energy effi ciency investments given assumed capital costs, value of a set of possible energy effi ciency investments given assumed capital costs, energy prices, investment horizons, and discount rates. energy prices, investment horizons, and discount rates.
Across many studies from different industries and sectors, a common theme Across many studies from different industries and sectors, a common theme seems to emerge: large fractions of energy can be conserved at seems to emerge: large fractions of energy can be conserved at negative net cost. net cost. That is, the studies conclude that consumers and fi rms are failing to exploit a That is, the studies conclude that consumers and fi rms are failing to exploit a massive amount of profi Rosenfeld, Atkinson, Koomey, Meier, Mowris, and Price (1993) concludes that between 20 and 60 percent of total electricity use, Price (1993) concludes that between 20 and 60 percent of total electricity use, depending on the study and the electricity cost assumption, can be conserved at depending on the study and the electricity cost assumption, can be conserved at negative cost. The McKinsey & Co. (2009) analysis quoted in our introduction negative cost. The McKinsey & Co. (2009) analysis quoted in our introduction suggests that 23 percent of U.S. nontransportation energy demand can be elimisuggests that 23 percent of U.S. nontransportation energy demand can be eliminated at negative cost. These engineering studies are a large part of the basis for nated at negative cost. These engineering studies are a large part of the basis for the claims about the Energy Effi ciency Gap. the claims about the Energy Effi ciency Gap.
However, it is diffi cult to take at face value the quantitative conclusions of However, it is diffi cult to take at face value the quantitative conclusions of the engineering analyses as they suffer from the empirical problems introduced the engineering analyses as they suffer from the empirical problems introduced in the previous section. First, engineering costs typically incorporate only upfront in the previous section. First, engineering costs typically incorporate only upfront capital costs and omit opportunity costs or other unobserved factors ( capital costs and omit opportunity costs or other unobserved factors (ξ ξ in the model in the model presented earlier). For example, Anderson and Newell (2004) analyze energy audits presented earlier). For example, Anderson and Newell (2004) analyze energy audits that the U.S. Department of Energy provides for free to small-and medium-sized that the U.S. Department of Energy provides for free to small-and medium-sized enterprises. They fi nd that nearly half of investments that engineering assessments enterprises. They fi nd that nearly half of investments that engineering assessments showed would have short payback periods were not adopted due to unaccounted showed would have short payback periods were not adopted due to unaccounted physical costs, risks, or opportunity costs, such as "lack of staff for analysis/implephysical costs, risks, or opportunity costs, such as "lack of staff for analysis/implementation," "risk of inconvenience to personnel," or "suspected risk of problem mentation," "risk of inconvenience to personnel," or "suspected risk of problem with equipment." with equipment." Second, the engineering estimates of energy saved may be faulty. For example, Second, the engineering estimates of energy saved may be faulty. For example, in the context of home energy weatherization, Dubin, Miedema, and Chandran in the context of home energy weatherization, Dubin, Miedema, and Chandran (1986) , Nadel and Keating (1991) , and others have documented that engineering (1986), Nadel and Keating (1991) , and others have documented that engineering estimates of energy savings can overstate true fi eld returns, sometimes by a large estimates of energy savings can overstate true fi eld returns, sometimes by a large amount. Even in the two decades since these studies, some engineering simuamount. Even in the two decades since these studies, some engineering simulation models have still not been fully calibrated to approximate actual returns lation models have still not been fully calibrated to approximate actual returns (Blasnik 2010). (Blasnik 2010).
Empirical Estimates of Returns on Investment
Another approach to measuring the Energy Effi ciency Gap is to use empirical Another approach to measuring the Energy Effi ciency Gap is to use empirical energy use data to estimate the average returns for the set of consumers that adopt energy use data to estimate the average returns for the set of consumers that adopt an energy effi cient technology. Most of the evidence in this category analyzes the an energy effi cient technology. Most of the evidence in this category analyzes the costs and benefi ts of the Weatherization Assistance Program, which is intended costs and benefi ts of the Weatherization Assistance Program, which is intended to be both a transfer to low-income homeowners and an energy effi ciency to be both a transfer to low-income homeowners and an energy effi ciency investment with positive net returns. The typical empirical analysis compares investment with positive net returns. The typical empirical analysis compares natural gas billing data in the fi rst year after the weatherization work was done natural gas billing data in the fi rst year after the weatherization work was done to the year before, using either a statistical correction for weather differences to the year before, using either a statistical correction for weather differences or a nonrandomly selected control group of low-income households. Schweitzer or a nonrandomly selected control group of low-income households. Schweitzer (2005) analyzes 38 separate empirical evaluations of weatherization projects from (2005) As evidence on the Energy Effi ciency Gap, such analyses again suffer from the As evidence on the Energy Effi ciency Gap, such analyses again suffer from the problems introduced in the previous section. First, there are potentially substanproblems introduced in the previous section. First, there are potentially substantial unobserved costs and benefi ts (the tial unobserved costs and benefi ts (the ξ ξ in our model) from weatherization. in our model) from weatherization.
Weatherization takes time, and for most people it is not highly enjoyable: the process Weatherization takes time, and for most people it is not highly enjoyable: the process requires one or sometimes two home energy audits, a contractor appointment requires one or sometimes two home energy audits, a contractor appointment to carry out the work, and sometimes additional follow-up visits and paperwork. to carry out the work, and sometimes additional follow-up visits and paperwork. Some benefi ts are also diffi cult to quantify: for example, weatherization typically Some benefi ts are also diffi cult to quantify: for example, weatherization typically makes homes more comfortable and less drafty. Furthermore, weatherization makes homes more comfortable and less drafty. Furthermore, weatherization reduces the cost of energy services such as warmer indoor temperatures on a reduces the cost of energy services such as warmer indoor temperatures on a cold winter day, and this cost reduction causes people to increase their utilization cold winter day, and this cost reduction causes people to increase their utilization of these services. (In the energy literature, this is called the "rebound effect.") of these services. (In the energy literature, this is called the "rebound effect.") Measuring the change in energy use from weatherization without accounting for Measuring the change in energy use from weatherization without accounting for the utility gain from an increase in utilization of energy services understates the the utility gain from an increase in utilization of energy services understates the welfare benefi ts. welfare benefi ts. Second, the net present value of energy cost reductions is unknown. The Second, the net present value of energy cost reductions is unknown. The empirical estimates are based on short-term analyses, and the persistence of returns empirical estimates are based on short-term analyses, and the persistence of returns over many years is rarely assessed. If the $260 annual savings from Schweitzer (2005) over many years is rarely assessed. If the $260 annual savings from Schweitzer (2005) are assumed to have a lifetime of 10 years or less, then weatherization does not pay are assumed to have a lifetime of 10 years or less, then weatherization does not pay back the $2,600 cost at any positive discount rate. At lifetimes of 15 or 20 years, the back the $2,600 cost at any positive discount rate. At lifetimes of 15 or 20 years, the discount rate that equates future discounted benefi ts with current costs (the internal discount rate that equates future discounted benefi ts with current costs (the internal rate of return) is 5.6 or 7.8 percent, respectively. Furthermore, all of the estimates rate of return) is 5.6 or 7.8 percent, respectively. Furthermore, all of the estimates are nonexperimental, and households that weatherize may also engage in other are nonexperimental, and households that weatherize may also engage in other unobserved activities that affect energy use. This may be a larger concern with nonunobserved activities that affect energy use. This may be a larger concern with nonlow-income weatherization programs, in which homeowners might be more likely to low-income weatherization programs, in which homeowners might be more likely to carry out renovations and energy effi ciency work at the same time. carry out renovations and energy effi ciency work at the same time.
Third, the effects of weatherization on energy use are heterogeneous. For Third, the effects of weatherization on energy use are heterogeneous. For example, Metcalf and Hassett (1999) estimate the distribution of returns to attic example, Metcalf and Hassett (1999) estimate the distribution of returns to attic insulation in the U.S. population using a weather-adjusted difference estimator with insulation in the U.S. population using a weather-adjusted difference estimator with nationally representative panel data. The estimated median and mean returns on nationally representative panel data. The estimated median and mean returns on investment are on the order of 10 percent, and one-quarter of households had investment are on the order of 10 percent, and one-quarter of households had returns greater than 13.5 percent. This heterogeneity means that while estimates returns greater than 13.5 percent. This heterogeneity means that while estimates of average returns for adopters could in principle be meaningful in evaluating the of average returns for adopters could in principle be meaningful in evaluating the costs and benefi ts of an existing program, a simple selection model like the one costs and benefi ts of an existing program, a simple selection model like the one above would imply that the net returns for adopters overstate the net returns for above would imply that the net returns for adopters overstate the net returns for non-adopters. On net, the available evidence seems inconsistent with signifi cant non-adopters. On net, the available evidence seems inconsistent with signifi cant investment ineffi ciencies in the context of weatherization. investment ineffi ciencies in the context of weatherization.
Cost Effectiveness of Energy Conservation Programs
Many electric utilities run "demand-side management" programs, which largely Many electric utilities run "demand-side management" programs, which largely consist of subsidies to households and fi rms to purchase energy effi cient appliances, consist of subsidies to households and fi rms to purchase energy effi cient appliances, air conditioning and heating systems, and other equipment. If these programs can air conditioning and heating systems, and other equipment. If these programs can reduce energy use at less than the cost of energy, the argument goes, then there were reduce energy use at less than the cost of energy, the argument goes, then there were investment ineffi ciencies, and the programs should be viewed as welfare-enhancing. investment ineffi ciencies, and the programs should be viewed as welfare-enhancing.
The simplest example of this approach is to divide the annual spending on The simplest example of this approach is to divide the annual spending on these programs by estimates of electricity savings, as in Gillingham, Newell, and these programs by estimates of electricity savings, as in Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer (2006) . For 2009, U.S. electric utilities reported $2.255 billion in direct Palmer (2006) . For 2009, U.S. electric utilities reported $2.255 billion in direct costs and 76.9 terawatt-hours of savings for demand-side management programs, costs and 76.9 terawatt-hours of savings for demand-side management programs,
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according to the according to the 2009 Electric Power Annual (EIA 2010, tables 9.6 and 9.7). Dividing (EIA 2010, tables 9.6 and 9.7). Dividing these two fi gures gives a cost effectiveness of 2.9 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh). these two fi gures gives a cost effectiveness of 2.9 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh).
Analyses such as these suffer from the same problems introduced in the previous Analyses such as these suffer from the same problems introduced in the previous section. First, the reported "costs" are typically costs to the utility, not including costs section. First, the reported "costs" are typically costs to the utility, not including costs incurred by program participants, which may be almost as large (Nadel and Geller incurred by program participants, which may be almost as large (Nadel and Geller 1996; Joskow and Marron 1992; Eto, Kito, Shown, and Sonnenblick 1995; Friedrich, 1996; Joskow and Marron 1992 (2011), whose point estimates indicate that between 1992 and 2006, demand-side management conserved electricity at a program cost of 5.0 and demand-side management conserved electricity at a program cost of 5.0 and 6.1 cents per kilowatt hour, assuming discount rates of 5 and 7 percent, respectively. 6.1 cents per kilowatt hour, assuming discount rates of 5 and 7 percent, respectively. If one further assumes, based on the analyses in the paragraph above, that addiIf one further assumes, based on the analyses in the paragraph above, that additional costs to consumers might be 70 percent of program costs, one concludes that tional costs to consumers might be 70 percent of program costs, one concludes that demand-side management programs have reduced energy use at an average cost of demand-side management programs have reduced energy use at an average cost of 5.0 5.0 × × (1 (1 + + .70) .70) = = 8.5 cents/kWh or 6.1 8.5 cents/kWh or 6.1 × × (1 (1 + + .70) .70) = = 10.4 cents/kWh, again using 10.4 cents/kWh, again using 5 or 7 percent discount rates, respectively. Comparing the investment cost per kWh 5 or 7 percent discount rates, respectively. Comparing the investment cost per kWh conserved to the national average electricity price of 9.1 cents/kWh, the investments conserved to the national average electricity price of 9.1 cents/kWh, the investments that occurred because of demand-side management programs were barely profi tthat occurred because of demand-side management programs were barely profi table at a discount rate of 5 percent, and barely unprofi table at a discount rate of able at a discount rate of 5 percent, and barely unprofi table at a discount rate of 7 percent. 7 percent.
5 5 Arimura et al. (2011) estimate that these programs reduced 1-2 percent Arimura et al. (2011) estimate that these programs reduced 1-2 percent of national electricity demand. Given that only a small percent of total electricity of national electricity demand. Given that only a small percent of total electricity demand was reduced at nearly zero excess profi ts, this evidence on demand-side demand was reduced at nearly zero excess profi ts, this evidence on demand-side management energy conservation programs does not suggest a pervasive Energy management energy conservation programs does not suggest a pervasive Energy Effi ciency Gap. Effi ciency Gap.
Tradeoffs between Durable Goods
The fi nal way of determining whether there are profi table returns to energy effiThe fi nal way of determining whether there are profi table returns to energy efficiency investments involves estimating consumer demand for household appliances ciency investments involves estimating consumer demand for household appliances or automobiles. This approach typically uses a discrete choice model to estimate or automobiles. This approach typically uses a discrete choice model to estimate utility function coeffi cients on purchase price and on the present discounted value utility function coeffi cients on purchase price and on the present discounted value of energy costs. The estimated coeffi cient on energy cost should be the same as the of energy costs. The estimated coeffi cient on energy cost should be the same as the estimated coeffi cient on price: that is, consumers should be indifferent between estimated coeffi cient on price: that is, consumers should be indifferent between spending a dollar in present value on energy and a dollar in present value on spending a dollar in present value on energy and a dollar in present value on purchase price. If the analyst's assumptions about discount rates, product utilizapurchase price. If the analyst's assumptions about discount rates, product utilization, and energy prices are correct, the ratio of these two coeffi cients is the tion, and energy prices are correct, the ratio of these two coeffi cients is the γ γ in our in our model above. model above.
In a seminal paper, Hausman (1979) estimated a discrete choice model using In a seminal paper, Hausman (1979) estimated a discrete choice model using 65 observations of consumer choices between air conditioner models, which vary in 65 observations of consumer choices between air conditioner models, which vary in upfront cost and energy effi ciency rating. Hausman framed his analysis as an estiupfront cost and energy effi ciency rating. Hausman framed his analysis as an estimate of an "implied discount rate" that rationalizes the demand system by assuming mate of an "implied discount rate" that rationalizes the demand system by assuming γ γ = = 1. Hausman's paper, along with Dubin and McFadden's (1984) analysis of 1. Hausman's paper, along with Dubin and McFadden's (1984) analysis of households' choices between heating systems, was the state of the art in this literahouseholds' choices between heating systems, was the state of the art in this literature for 30 years. Both papers fi nd real implied discount rates of 15 to 25 percent, ture for 30 years. Both papers fi nd real implied discount rates of 15 to 25 percent, which is higher than returns on stock market investments but not much different which is higher than returns on stock market investments but not much different from real credit card interest rates, which were around 18 percent. from real credit card interest rates, which were around 18 percent.
However, such analyses suffer from the problems introduced in the previous However, such analyses suffer from the problems introduced in the previous section. First, unobserved product attributes (which are analogous to section. First, unobserved product attributes (which are analogous to ξ ξ in our in our formal model) complicate the cross-sectional econometric approach. The coeffiformal model) complicate the cross-sectional econometric approach. The coefficient on the present discounted value of energy costs is biased if energy effi cient cient on the present discounted value of energy costs is biased if energy effi cient products have better or worse unobserved characteristics. For example, automobile products have better or worse unobserved characteristics. For example, automobile prices actually prices actually decrease in fuel economy, as the more energy effi cient vehicles are in fuel economy, as the more energy effi cient vehicles are smaller and often have fewer luxury amenities. Furthermore, product prices will smaller and often have fewer luxury amenities. Furthermore, product prices will often be correlated with unobserved attributes, giving the usual simultaneity bias often be correlated with unobserved attributes, giving the usual simultaneity bias in estimating price elasticity. As in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) , this issue in estimating price elasticity. As in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) , this issue can potentially be addressed by using instrumental variables, but the instruments can potentially be addressed by using instrumental variables, but the instruments available may be dissatisfying. available may be dissatisfying.
Working papers by Allcott and Wozny (2011) , Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer Working papers by Allcott and Wozny (2011) , Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer (2011) , and Sallee, West, and Fan (2011) use an alternative approach to address the (2011) , and Sallee, West, and Fan (2011) use an alternative approach to address the problem of unobserved attributes. These papers take a panel of used durable goods, problem of unobserved attributes. These papers take a panel of used durable goods, condition on product fi xed effects, and test how the relative prices of more energy condition on product fi xed effects, and test how the relative prices of more energy effi cient versus less effi cient products change as energy price expectations vary over effi cient versus less effi cient products change as energy price expectations vary over time. As an intuitive example of the identifi cation strategy, notice that as expected time. As an intuitive example of the identifi cation strategy, notice that as expected gasoline prices rise, we should expect to see the market price of a three-year-old gasoline prices rise, we should expect to see the market price of a three-year-old used Honda Civic increase relative to the price of a three-year-old Honda Accord, used Honda Civic increase relative to the price of a three-year-old Honda Accord, because the Civic is more energy effi cient than the Accord. If market prices are not because the Civic is more energy effi cient than the Accord. If market prices are not very responsive, this approach suggests that very responsive, this approach suggests that γ γ is small. is small. Relative to the other categories of evidence on the Energy Effi ciency Gap, Relative to the other categories of evidence on the Energy Effi ciency Gap, this approach is especially appealing because the fi xed effects eliminate unobthis approach is especially appealing because the fi xed effects eliminate unobserved costs by construction. However, these analyses still suffer from the second served costs by construction. However, these analyses still suffer from the second problem, which is that they still require assumptions about the relevant discount problem, which is that they still require assumptions about the relevant discount rate, vehicle-miles traveled, and consumers' expectations of future gasoline rate, vehicle-miles traveled, and consumers' expectations of future gasoline prices ( prices (r, , m, and , and p in our model above), and other factors. Allcott and Wozny's in our model above), and other factors. Allcott and Wozny's (2011) results tend to suggest that (2011) results tend to suggest that γ γ < < 1, while Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer's 1, while Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer's (2011) results tend not to support the hypothesis that (2011) results tend not to support the hypothesis that γ γ < < 1. The two analyses do 1. The two analyses do agree that even if there is some investment ineffi ciency, the welfare losses would agree that even if there is some investment ineffi ciency, the welfare losses would
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be relatively small. Allcott and Wozny show how to use discrete choice data to be relatively small. Allcott and Wozny show how to use discrete choice data to calculate the private welfare loss (equivalent to triangle calculate the private welfare loss (equivalent to triangle abf in Figure 3 above).
in Figure 3 above). Their preferred estimate of Their preferred estimate of γ γ suggests that investment ineffi ciencies in the auto suggests that investment ineffi ciencies in the auto market cause a welfare loss of about $1 billion per year and an increase in gasoline market cause a welfare loss of about $1 billion per year and an increase in gasoline consumption of about 5 percent. Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer's results tend consumption of about 5 percent. Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer's results tend not to suggest that there are investment ineffi ciencies, implying that there would not to suggest that there are investment ineffi ciencies, implying that there would be zero welfare losses. In either case, the welfare loss and gasoline consumption be zero welfare losses. In either case, the welfare loss and gasoline consumption increase appear to be small relative to the total market size. increase appear to be small relative to the total market size.
Investment Ineffi ciencies That Could Cause an Energy Effi ciency Gap
In the previous section, we examined evidence on whether consumers and In the previous section, we examined evidence on whether consumers and fi rms fail to exploit profi table energy effi ciency investments. In this section, we fi rms fail to exploit profi table energy effi ciency investments. In this section, we reverse the perspective by specifying particular investment ineffi ciencies that might reverse the perspective by specifying particular investment ineffi ciencies that might cause underinvestment in energy effi ciency and assessing the empirical evidence on cause underinvestment in energy effi ciency and assessing the empirical evidence on their magnitudes. their magnitudes.
Imperfect Information
Imperfect information is perhaps the most important form of investment inefImperfect information is perhaps the most important form of investment ineffi ciency that could cause an Energy Effi ciency Gap. Two basic models of imperfect fi ciency that could cause an Energy Effi ciency Gap. Two basic models of imperfect information are most relevant. In one model, consumers and fi rms may be unaware information are most relevant. In one model, consumers and fi rms may be unaware of potential investments in energy effi ciency. For example, homeowners may not of potential investments in energy effi ciency. For example, homeowners may not know how poorly insulated their home is and may not be aware of the opportuknow how poorly insulated their home is and may not be aware of the opportunity to weatherize. Similarly, factory managers may not know about a new type of nity to weatherize. Similarly, factory managers may not know about a new type of machine that could reduce their energy costs. machine that could reduce their energy costs.
An alternative model resembles Akerlof's (1970) "lemons" model. Buyers know An alternative model resembles Akerlof's (1970) "lemons" model. Buyers know that different products, such as apartments, commercial buildings, or factory equipthat different products, such as apartments, commercial buildings, or factory equipment, have different levels of energy effi ciency, but these differences are costly to ment, have different levels of energy effi ciency, but these differences are costly to observe. Thus, they are not willing to pay more for goods that are in fact more observe. Thus, they are not willing to pay more for goods that are in fact more energy effi cient. For example, a renter evaluating a set of different apartments may energy effi cient. For example, a renter evaluating a set of different apartments may be aware that there is a distribution of wall insulation quality and thus of resulting be aware that there is a distribution of wall insulation quality and thus of resulting heating costs, but the renter will not be willing to pay more for a well-insulated heating costs, but the renter will not be willing to pay more for a well-insulated apartment without taking the time to inspect the insulation. apartment without taking the time to inspect the insulation.
There are three approaches to assessing the magnitude of imperfect informaThere are three approaches to assessing the magnitude of imperfect information in the context of energy effi ciency. The fi rst approach is to test for market tion in the context of energy effi ciency. The fi rst approach is to test for market equilibria consistent with imperfect information. Several recent projects used this equilibria consistent with imperfect information. Several recent projects used this approach in the context of renter-occupied versus owner-occupied housing units. approach in the context of renter-occupied versus owner-occupied housing units. The theory is that because imperfectly informed renters will not be willing to pay The theory is that because imperfectly informed renters will not be willing to pay more for energy effi cient apartments, landlords have reduced incentive to invest more for energy effi cient apartments, landlords have reduced incentive to invest in energy effi ciency. Homeowners, on the other hand, do capture the benefi ts of in energy effi ciency. Homeowners, on the other hand, do capture the benefi ts of improved energy effi ciency, at least until they sell the property. Such a "landlordimproved energy effi ciency, at least until they sell the property. Such a "landlordtenant" agency problem implies that rental properties are less energy effi cient than tenant" agency problem implies that rental properties are less energy effi cient than would be socially optimal. As an example of this approach, Davis (2010) studies the would be socially optimal. As an example of this approach, Davis (2010) studies the market penetration of refrigerators, dishwashers, light bulbs, room air conditioners, market penetration of refrigerators, dishwashers, light bulbs, room air conditioners, and clothes washers that have earned the U.S. government's "Energy Star" designaand clothes washers that have earned the U.S. government's "Energy Star" designation, meaning that they are relatively energy effi cient. Conditional on observable tion, meaning that they are relatively energy effi cient. Conditional on observable characteristics, renters are 1 to 10 percentage points less likely to report having characteristics, renters are 1 to 10 percentage points less likely to report having Energy Star appliances. The author calculates that if renters had the same energy Energy Star appliances. The author calculates that if renters had the same energy effi cient appliance ownership rates as owner-occupied homes, total energy bills in effi cient appliance ownership rates as owner-occupied homes, total energy bills in rental homes would be 0.5 percent lower. rental homes would be 0.5 percent lower.
The appliances that Davis (2010) considers make up only one-quarter of resiThe appliances that Davis (2010) considers make up only one-quarter of residential energy use. Heating and cooling represent close to one-half, meaning that dential energy use. Heating and cooling represent close to one-half, meaning that insulation is perhaps a more important investment that could be subject to the insulation is perhaps a more important investment that could be subject to the landlord-tenant agency problem. Gillingham, Harding, and Rapson (2012) show landlord-tenant agency problem. Gillingham, Harding, and Rapson (2012) show that owner-occupied houses in California are 12 to 20 percent more likely to have that owner-occupied houses in California are 12 to 20 percent more likely to have insulation than rentals, conditional on other observable characteristics of the propinsulation than rentals, conditional on other observable characteristics of the property, occupant, and neighborhood. Under the optimistic assumption that insulation erty, occupant, and neighborhood. Under the optimistic assumption that insulation reduces total energy demand by 10 percent, this implies that rental properties would reduces total energy demand by 10 percent, this implies that rental properties would use 1.2 to 2.0 percent less energy if insulated at the same level as owner-occupied use 1.2 to 2.0 percent less energy if insulated at the same level as owner-occupied properties. As both Davis (2010) and Gillingham, Harding, and Rapson (2012) properties. As both Davis (2010) and Gillingham, Harding, and Rapson (2012) note, conditional differences in appliance ownership between owners and renters note, conditional differences in appliance ownership between owners and renters are not ironclad evidence of a market failure, because preferences or housing stock are not ironclad evidence of a market failure, because preferences or housing stock could vary in unobservable ways. could vary in unobservable ways.
If these estimates are assumed to be causal, how big is the investment inefIf these estimates are assumed to be causal, how big is the investment ineffi ciency from the landlord-tenant agency problem? The magnitude is the number fi ciency from the landlord-tenant agency problem? The magnitude is the number of affected households times the extent of the reduced energy effi ciency. Of of affected households times the extent of the reduced energy effi ciency. Of U.S. households, 29 percent are rental units where the renter pays energy bills U.S. households, 29 percent are rental units where the renter pays energy bills (Murtishaw and Sathaye 2006) . Multiplying this fi gure by several percent of total (Murtishaw and Sathaye 2006) . Multiplying this fi gure by several percent of total energy demand, to approximate the magnitude of the ineffi ciencies estimated energy demand, to approximate the magnitude of the ineffi ciencies estimated above, implies that the landlord-tenant information problem might increase above, implies that the landlord-tenant information problem might increase total residential energy use on the order of 1 percent. Thus, while the empirical total residential energy use on the order of 1 percent. Thus, while the empirical evidence points to some ineffi ciency, it explains only a very small fraction of the evidence points to some ineffi ciency, it explains only a very small fraction of the purported Energy Effi ciency Gap. purported Energy Effi ciency Gap. 6 6 An additional example of testing for imperfect information using equilibrium An additional example of testing for imperfect information using equilibrium outcomes is to examine whether information disclosure increases the elasticity outcomes is to examine whether information disclosure increases the elasticity of energy-saving technical change with respect to energy prices. The idea is that of energy-saving technical change with respect to energy prices. The idea is that consumers who are better informed about energy use will be more responsive to consumers who are better informed about energy use will be more responsive to energy price changes when choosing between models of an energy-using durable. energy price changes when choosing between models of an energy-using durable. Therefore, fi rms with better-informed consumers will be more likely to offer more Therefore, fi rms with better-informed consumers will be more likely to offer more energy effi cient models as energy prices rise. Newell, Jaffe, and Stavins (1999) show energy effi cient models as energy prices rise. Newell, Jaffe, and Stavins (1999) show that the mean energy effi ciency of room air conditioners and water heaters was that the mean energy effi ciency of room air conditioners and water heaters was more responsive to energy prices after 1981 and 1977, respectively, the years when more responsive to energy prices after 1981 and 1977, respectively, the years when the federal government introduced energy effi ciency labeling requirements for the the federal government introduced energy effi ciency labeling requirements for the two goods. While other factors might also have changed in these years, this fi nding two goods. While other factors might also have changed in these years, this fi nding suggests that the labeling requirements may have reduced the extent of imperfect suggests that the labeling requirements may have reduced the extent of imperfect information. However, this approach is not informative about the magnitude of any information. However, this approach is not informative about the magnitude of any remaining investment ineffi ciency. remaining investment ineffi ciency.
A second approach that can allow a direct assessment of the magnitude of A second approach that can allow a direct assessment of the magnitude of imperfect information is to observe information sets through surveys. Turrentine imperfect information is to observe information sets through surveys. Turrentine and Kurani (2007) and Larrick and Soll (2008) use structured interviews and and Kurani (2007) and Larrick and Soll (2008) use structured interviews and laboratory studies to show that consumers are not very good at calculating the laboratory studies to show that consumers are not very good at calculating the gasoline costs for different automobiles. The 2010 Vehicle Ownership and Alternagasoline costs for different automobiles. The 2010 Vehicle Ownership and Alternatives Survey (Allcott 2011a (Allcott , 2012 adds nationally representative evidence on how tives Survey (Allcott 2011a (Allcott , 2012 adds nationally representative evidence on how accurately consumers perceive the fi nancial value of energy effi ciency. The data accurately consumers perceive the fi nancial value of energy effi ciency. The data suggest that consumers are indeed imperfectly informed: over half of Americans suggest that consumers are indeed imperfectly informed: over half of Americans mis-estimate the gasoline cost differences between the vehicle they own and their mis-estimate the gasoline cost differences between the vehicle they own and their "second choice vehicle" by more than 40 percent. However, the errors run in both "second choice vehicle" by more than 40 percent. However, the errors run in both directions, and there is no clear evidence on whether the average consumer systemdirections, and there is no clear evidence on whether the average consumer systematically underestimates or overestimates the energy cost savings from higher-fuel atically underestimates or overestimates the energy cost savings from higher-fuel economy vehicles. Thus, while these analyses document imperfect information, economy vehicles. Thus, while these analyses document imperfect information, none provides evidence that none provides evidence that γ γ < < 1. 1.
A third approach to assessing the magnitude of imperfect information is to A third approach to assessing the magnitude of imperfect information is to test for the effects of information disclosure on purchase decisions. This approach test for the effects of information disclosure on purchase decisions. This approach has the benefi t of being based on observed choices in the marketplace, instead of has the benefi t of being based on observed choices in the marketplace, instead of beliefs stated on a survey. We are not aware of any large-scale randomized evaluabeliefs stated on a survey. We are not aware of any large-scale randomized evaluations of energy effi ciency information disclosure. tions of energy effi ciency information disclosure.
Inattention
Interventions that resemble information disclosure might change the buying Interventions that resemble information disclosure might change the buying patterns of consumers who are already well-informed. For example, Chetty, Looney, patterns of consumers who are already well-informed. For example, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) fi nd that despite the fact that consumers are well-informed about and Kroft (2009) fi nd that despite the fact that consumers are well-informed about sales taxes, posting information about sales tax amounts in a supermarket changes sales taxes, posting information about sales tax amounts in a supermarket changes buying patterns. This fi nding suggests the existence of another type of investment buying patterns. This fi nding suggests the existence of another type of investment ineffi ciency, which behavioral economists call inattention. ineffi ciency, which behavioral economists call inattention.
The psychology of inattention starts by recognizing that choice problems have The psychology of inattention starts by recognizing that choice problems have many different facets, and some of these facets are less salient at the time of choice many different facets, and some of these facets are less salient at the time of choice even if they are potentially important to the utility that will later be experienced. even if they are potentially important to the utility that will later be experienced. When buying printers, for example, we might focus on the purchase price and fail When buying printers, for example, we might focus on the purchase price and fail to consider that replacement ink cartridges make up the bulk of the total cost. to consider that replacement ink cartridges make up the bulk of the total cost. Inattentive consumers are misoptimizing: they fail to recognize opportunities to Inattentive consumers are misoptimizing: they fail to recognize opportunities to save money by choosing products with lower ancillary costs. Research in a variety of save money by choosing products with lower ancillary costs. Research in a variety of other non-energy settings is suggestive of inattention (Hossein and Morgan 2006; other non-energy settings is suggestive of inattention (Hossein and Morgan 2006; Barber, Odean, and Zheng 2005; Gabaix and Laibson 2006) . It seems possible that Barber, Odean, and Zheng 2005; Gabaix and Laibson 2006) . It seems possible that some consumers might be inattentive to energy effi ciency when purchasing energysome consumers might be inattentive to energy effi ciency when purchasing energyusing durable goods. using durable goods.
Policy Implications
The available evidence on the size of an Energy Effi ciency Gap is situationThe available evidence on the size of an Energy Effi ciency Gap is situationspecifi c, mixed, and often inconclusive. However, policymakers must make policy specifi c, mixed, and often inconclusive. However, policymakers must make policy even in the absence of ironclad evidence. even in the absence of ironclad evidence.
The most important policy recommendation in this context, as in others, is to The most important policy recommendation in this context, as in others, is to address market failures as directly as possible. In response to energy use externaliaddress market failures as directly as possible. In response to energy use externalities, a Pigouvian tax gives the fi rst-best outcome. If agents are imperfectly informed ties, a Pigouvian tax gives the fi rst-best outcome. If agents are imperfectly informed and the government has an inexpensive information disclosure technology, an and the government has an inexpensive information disclosure technology, an information disclosure approach should be used. Formulating policy becomes more information disclosure approach should be used. Formulating policy becomes more challenging if the fi rst-best solutions are not possible-when information disclosure challenging if the fi rst-best solutions are not possible-when information disclosure is not fully effective, or when a Pigouvian tax is not politically feasible because of is not fully effective, or when a Pigouvian tax is not politically feasible because of aversion to new taxes or to policies that explicitly regulate greenhouse gases. In aversion to new taxes or to policies that explicitly regulate greenhouse gases. In this section, we examine the effects of energy effi ciency policies, considered as a this section, we examine the effects of energy effi ciency policies, considered as a second-best alternative. second-best alternative.
Energy Effi ciency Subsidies and Standards as a Second-Best Approach to Pollution Abatement
Until now, we have set aside the uninternalized energy use externalities and Until now, we have set aside the uninternalized energy use externalities and focused on investment ineffi ciencies. We now examine the converse: say that no focused on investment ineffi ciencies. We now examine the converse: say that no investment ineffi ciencies exist, but energy is priced below social cost (in our model, investment ineffi ciencies exist, but energy is priced below social cost (in our model, φ φ > > 0). If Pigouvian taxes or cap-and-trade programs are politically infeasible, are 0). If Pigouvian taxes or cap-and-trade programs are politically infeasible, are energy effi ciency subsidies and standards a relatively promising approach to polluenergy effi ciency subsidies and standards a relatively promising approach to pollution abatement? tion abatement?
When no investment ineffi ciencies exist, energy effi ciency policies such as When no investment ineffi ciencies exist, energy effi ciency policies such as subsidies for energy effi cient durable goods and minimum energy effi ciency stansubsidies for energy effi cient durable goods and minimum energy effi ciency standards will have larger welfare costs per unit of pollution abated compared to the dards will have larger welfare costs per unit of pollution abated compared to the fi rst-best Pigouvian tax for several reasons: First, subsidies and standards change fi rst-best Pigouvian tax for several reasons: First, subsidies and standards change relative prices for all consumers equally, while the Pigouvian tax provides a larger relative prices for all consumers equally, while the Pigouvian tax provides a larger incentive for consumers with higher utilization to choose energy effi cient capital incentive for consumers with higher utilization to choose energy effi cient capital stock. Second, the fi rst-best policy must impose the right price on the utilization stock. Second, the fi rst-best policy must impose the right price on the utilization decision, which only the Pigouvian tax does. Third, it is diffi cult to calibrate the decision, which only the Pigouvian tax does. Third, it is diffi cult to calibrate the stringency of an energy effi ciency standard or subsidy precisely, meaning that it stringency of an energy effi ciency standard or subsidy precisely, meaning that it will likely generate more or less carbon abatement than a Pigouvian tax set at the will likely generate more or less carbon abatement than a Pigouvian tax set at the level of marginal damages. Energy effi ciency policies in different sectors can also level of marginal damages. Energy effi ciency policies in different sectors can also be miscalibrated against each other, causing ineffi ciency due to unequal marginal be miscalibrated against each other, causing ineffi ciency due to unequal marginal costs of abatement. costs of abatement.
Of course, if these three theoretical factors were small in reality, then energy Of course, if these three theoretical factors were small in reality, then energy effi ciency policies might be a reasonable second-best substitute for Pigouvian effi ciency policies might be a reasonable second-best substitute for Pigouvian taxes. Several analyses have simulated the relative cost effectiveness of particular taxes. Several analyses have simulated the relative cost effectiveness of particular energy effi ciency policies relative to Pigouvian taxes. Jacobsen (2010) , for example, energy effi ciency policies relative to Pigouvian taxes. Jacobsen (2010) , for example, simulates automobile supply and demand and shows that Corporate Average Fuel simulates automobile supply and demand and shows that Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards have a welfare cost of $222 per metric ton of carbon Economy (CAFE) standards have a welfare cost of $222 per metric ton of carbon dioxide abated, compared to $92 per ton for a gas tax that generates the same dioxide abated, compared to $92 per ton for a gas tax that generates the same Is There an Energy Effi ciency Gap? 23 amount of abatement. Krupnick, Parry, Walls, Knowles, and Hayes (2010) come to amount of abatement. Krupnick, Parry, Walls, Knowles, and Hayes (2010) come to a similar qualitative conclusion. They compare the cap-and-trade provisions of the a similar qualitative conclusion. They compare the cap-and-trade provisions of the proposed Waxman-Markey climate change legislation to the legislation's energy proposed Waxman-Markey climate change legislation to the legislation's energy effi ciency provisions, which include standards for buildings, lighting, and applieffi ciency provisions, which include standards for buildings, lighting, and appliances. The cap-and-trade, or an equivalent carbon tax, abates carbon dioxide at ances. The cap-and-trade, or an equivalent carbon tax, abates carbon dioxide at a welfare cost of $12 per ton. If there are no investment ineffi ciencies, the energy a welfare cost of $12 per ton. If there are no investment ineffi ciencies, the energy effi ciency standards are fi ve times more costly, or $60 per ton. This signifi cantly effi ciency standards are fi ve times more costly, or $60 per ton. This signifi cantly exceeds the United States government's estimated social cost of carbon dioxide exceeds the United States government's estimated social cost of carbon dioxide emissions, which is about $21 (Greenstone, Kopits, and Wolverton 2011) . emissions, which is about $21 (Greenstone, Kopits, and Wolverton 2011) .
These results forcefully argue that Pigouvian taxes or cap-and-trade programs These results forcefully argue that Pigouvian taxes or cap-and-trade programs are the most effi cient way to address energy use externalities. Energy effi ciency subsiare the most effi cient way to address energy use externalities. Energy effi ciency subsidies, CAFE standards, and other energy effi ciency policies can also reduce energy dies, CAFE standards, and other energy effi ciency policies can also reduce energy use externalities, but in the absence of investment ineffi ciencies, they will often use externalities, but in the absence of investment ineffi ciencies, they will often impose a signifi cantly larger cost on the economy per unit of pollution reduction. impose a signifi cantly larger cost on the economy per unit of pollution reduction.
Energy Effi ciency Subsidies and Standards as a Second-Best Approach to Correcting Investment Ineffi ciencies
The United States has long required energy-use information disclosure: for The United States has long required energy-use information disclosure: for more than 30 years, retailers have been required to display fuel economy ratings more than 30 years, retailers have been required to display fuel economy ratings for new vehicles and energy cost information for home appliances. However, for new vehicles and energy cost information for home appliances. However, consumers may not notice, understand, or pay attention to this information. If consumers may not notice, understand, or pay attention to this information. If information disclosure or other direct solutions to market failures are not fully information disclosure or other direct solutions to market failures are not fully effective, how useful are energy effi ciency subsidies and standards as a second-best effective, how useful are energy effi ciency subsidies and standards as a second-best approach to addressing investment ineffi ciencies? approach to addressing investment ineffi ciencies? Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky (2011) analyze this question when Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky (2011) analyze this question when consumers are inattentive to energy costs. As we discussed earlier, their model shows consumers are inattentive to energy costs. As we discussed earlier, their model shows that energy effi ciency subsidies can increase welfare and, when consumers are suffithat energy effi ciency subsidies can increase welfare and, when consumers are sufficiently homogeneous, the fi rst-best can be obtained. The intuition is straightforward: ciently homogeneous, the fi rst-best can be obtained. The intuition is straightforward: if consumers and fi rms underinvest in energy effi ciency, subsidizing or mandating if consumers and fi rms underinvest in energy effi ciency, subsidizing or mandating them to invest more can increase welfare. However, any corrective policies must be them to invest more can increase welfare. However, any corrective policies must be properly calibrated. For example, the vast majority of benefi ts in the U.S. government's properly calibrated. For example, the vast majority of benefi ts in the U.S. government's cost-benefi t analysis of Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards derive from the cost-benefi t analysis of Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards derive from the assumption that the regulation corrects consumers' inattention to energy effi ciency assumption that the regulation corrects consumers' inattention to energy effi ciency when buying autos. when buying autos. 7 7 However, Allcott and Wozny (2011 ), Fischer, Harrington, and However, Allcott and Wozny (2011 ), Fischer, Harrington, and Parry (2007 , and Heutel (2011) use different models to show that the current Parry (2007), and Heutel (2011) use different models to show that the current and proposed CAFE standards are much more stringent than can be justifi ed by even and proposed CAFE standards are much more stringent than can be justifi ed by even worst-case estimates of investment ineffi ciencies. Of course, if there are zero investworst-case estimates of investment ineffi ciencies. Of course, if there are zero investment ineffi ciencies, then there are zero welfare benefi ts through this channel. ment ineffi ciencies, then there are zero welfare benefi ts through this channel.
Heterogeneity in the investment ineffi ciency Heterogeneity in the investment ineffi ciency γ γ weakens the policy argument for weakens the policy argument for subsidizing energy effi cient goods, as Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky (2011) subsidizing energy effi cient goods, as Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky (2011) also show. In Figure 3 presented earlier, imagine that some consumers are on demand also show. In Figure 3 presented earlier, imagine that some consumers are on demand curve curve D ′ ′ with with γ γ = = 1, while others are on demand curve 1, while others are on demand curve D with with γ γ < < 1. Now, a subsidy 1. Now, a subsidy moves the highmoves the high-γ γ agents to point agents to point z, where they consume more energy effi ciency than , where they consume more energy effi ciency than they would in the social optimum. This offsets the welfare gains from improving they would in the social optimum. This offsets the welfare gains from improving the decisions of the lowthe decisions of the low-γ γ consumers. A key implication for policy analysis is that we consumers. A key implication for policy analysis is that we must understand not just must understand not just how much a policy increases sales of energy effi cient goods, a policy increases sales of energy effi cient goods, but but who are the people induced to buy these goods. For example, even in a setting are the people induced to buy these goods. For example, even in a setting where the average consumer has where the average consumer has γ γ < < 1, energy effi ciency subsidies might decrease 1, energy effi ciency subsidies might decrease total welfare if they are largely taken up by environmentalists and homeowners, who total welfare if they are largely taken up by environmentalists and homeowners, who are more likely to be well-informed about energy effi ciency and are not subject to a are more likely to be well-informed about energy effi ciency and are not subject to a "landlord-tenant" agency problem. "landlord-tenant" agency problem.
This discussion highlights that energy effi ciency policies are more likely to This discussion highlights that energy effi ciency policies are more likely to increase welfare if they target agents subject to the largest investment ineffi ciencies. increase welfare if they target agents subject to the largest investment ineffi ciencies. Some existing policies do appear well-targeted. For example, households that use Some existing policies do appear well-targeted. For example, households that use more energy than other comparable households are more likely to have low-cost more energy than other comparable households are more likely to have low-cost energy conservation opportunities of which they are unaware, and many U.S. utilities energy conservation opportunities of which they are unaware, and many U.S. utilities now target energy conservation information to these relatively heavy users (Allcott now target energy conservation information to these relatively heavy users (Allcott 2011b; Ayres, Raseman, and Shih 2009) . "Smart meters" that record hourly consump2011b; Ayres, Raseman, and Shih 2009). "Smart meters" that record hourly consumption, which as described in a companion paper by Paul Joskow in this symposium are tion, which as described in a companion paper by Paul Joskow in this symposium are increasingly being deployed across the United States, also provide information useful increasingly being deployed across the United States, also provide information useful for targeting. For example, utilities can now identify households that use more energy for targeting. For example, utilities can now identify households that use more energy on afternoon hours of particularly hot days, suggesting that they have energy inefon afternoon hours of particularly hot days, suggesting that they have energy ineffi cient air conditioners, and send them information on new energy effi cient models. fi cient air conditioners, and send them information on new energy effi cient models.
Aside from heterogeneity in the investment ineffi ciency, consumers and fi rms Aside from heterogeneity in the investment ineffi ciency, consumers and fi rms also have substantial heterogeneity in other factors that affect demand for energy also have substantial heterogeneity in other factors that affect demand for energy and for energy effi cient capital stock. For example, the mild climate of Los Angeles and for energy effi cient capital stock. For example, the mild climate of Los Angeles compared to the more extreme weather of Chicago means that there is substantial compared to the more extreme weather of Chicago means that there is substantial variation in utilization of air conditioners and heating equipment, and residential variation in utilization of air conditioners and heating equipment, and residential retail electricity prices vary across the country from 4 to 30 cents per kilowatt-hour. retail electricity prices vary across the country from 4 to 30 cents per kilowatt-hour. As a result, national-level minimum effi ciency standards for home appliances seem As a result, national-level minimum effi ciency standards for home appliances seem likely to decrease welfare for subsets of consumers with low prices and utilization and likely to decrease welfare for subsets of consumers with low prices and utilization and could increase welfare for high-price and/or -utilization consumers with investment could increase welfare for high-price and/or -utilization consumers with investment ineffi ciencies. Ideally, standards could vary geographically to take account of this, ineffi ciencies. Ideally, standards could vary geographically to take account of this, targeting consumers that may have the most to gain. For example, building codes targeting consumers that may have the most to gain. For example, building codes in states with extreme weather often require more insulation than building codes in in states with extreme weather often require more insulation than building codes in mild climates. On the other hand, home appliance standards are set at the national mild climates. On the other hand, home appliance standards are set at the national level, and appliance manufacturers and retailers operate nationwide. The benefi ts of level, and appliance manufacturers and retailers operate nationwide. The benefi ts of heterogeneous standards must be weighed against the costs of regulatory complexity. heterogeneous standards must be weighed against the costs of regulatory complexity.
Conclusion
Since the energy crises of the 1970s, many have made the "win-win" argument Since the energy crises of the 1970s, many have made the "win-win" argument for energy effi ciency policy: subsidies and standards can both address investment for energy effi ciency policy: subsidies and standards can both address investment
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ineffi ciencies in the purchase of energy-using durable goods and reduce externalities ineffi ciencies in the purchase of energy-using durable goods and reduce externalities from energy use. A reliance on observational studies of variable credibility and the from energy use. A reliance on observational studies of variable credibility and the possibility of unobserved costs and benefi ts of energy effi ciency make it diffi cult to possibility of unobserved costs and benefi ts of energy effi ciency make it diffi cult to assess the magnitude of the Energy Effi ciency Gap defi nitively. Nevertheless, the assess the magnitude of the Energy Effi ciency Gap defi nitively. Nevertheless, the available evidence from empirical analyses of weatherization, demand-side manageavailable evidence from empirical analyses of weatherization, demand-side management programs, automobile and appliance markets, the "landlord-tenant" agency ment programs, automobile and appliance markets, the "landlord-tenant" agency problem, and information elicitation suggests that while investment ineffi ciencies problem, and information elicitation suggests that while investment ineffi ciencies do appear in various settings, the actual magnitude of the Energy Effi ciency Gap is do appear in various settings, the actual magnitude of the Energy Effi ciency Gap is small relative to the assessments from engineering analyses. small relative to the assessments from engineering analyses.
Furthermore, it appears likely that there is substantial heterogeneity in investFurthermore, it appears likely that there is substantial heterogeneity in investment ineffi ciencies across the population. Thus, targeted policies have the potential ment ineffi ciencies across the population. Thus, targeted policies have the potential to generate larger welfare gains than general subsidies or mandates. Given this to generate larger welfare gains than general subsidies or mandates. Given this heterogeneity, policy analyses need to do more than assess how much a policy affects heterogeneity, policy analyses need to do more than assess how much a policy affects energy effi ciency: they must also identify what types of consumers are induced to be energy effi ciency: they must also identify what types of consumers are induced to be more energy effi cient. more energy effi cient.
We believe that this area is ripe for rigorous empirical research. Future research We believe that this area is ripe for rigorous empirical research. Future research should utilize randomized controlled trials and quasi-experimental techniques to should utilize randomized controlled trials and quasi-experimental techniques to estimate the impacts of energy effi ciency programs on heterogeneous consumer estimate the impacts of energy effi ciency programs on heterogeneous consumer types and to address the challenges posed by unobserved costs and benefi ts. The types and to address the challenges posed by unobserved costs and benefi ts. The economic insights from such research are potentially generalizable, and the policy economic insights from such research are potentially generalizable, and the policy implications are signifi cant. implications are signifi cant.
